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The (Misunderstood) Genius of
American Corporate Law
Robert B. Ahdieh*
The genius of American corporate law is in its
federalist organization.I
With this simple aphorism, Roberta Romano artfully captures the
prevailing expectation of corporate scholars that state competition
will advance some movement-be it a race, a leisurely walk, or a
crawl-toward "the top" in corporate governance. In Trapped in a
Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for Corporate Gov-
ernance, I challenge this expectation.2 Unlike others, I do not insist
that state competition actually drives a "race to the bottom. '3 Nor do
I argue, like a number of recent works, that there is little or no race at
all. 4 Rather, I suggest that debates over the "race" in corporate law
* Professor of Law and Director, Center on Federalism and Intersystemic Governance,
Emory University School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center; Visiting Scholar, Institute for Advanced Study.
1 ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1 (1993).
2 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism
for Corporate Governance, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 255 (2009).
3 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate
Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
4 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Speeding Up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG.
139 (2003); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Recon-
sidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002); William W. Brat-
ton, Corporate Law's Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 401 (1994); Marcel
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misunderstand its destination. They fail, as such, to engage the actual
function of federalism in the operation and regulation of the modern
public corporation.
In the preceding pages, three thoughtful scholars offer their re-
sponses to this claim. I only regret that I did not have the benefit of
their insights as I authored the original piece. Had I, it would un-
doubtedly have been strengthened. With their reactions now in hand,
however, let me take advantage of this opportunity of reply, to clarify
precisely what it is that I aim to suggest.
At the outset, it bears acknowledging that my argument is prima-
rily directed to the scholarly discourse of corporate law. 5 While the
analysis I offer holds implications for questions of policy and regula-
tion in the governance of the modern public corporation, its immedi-
ate emphasis is on the ways in which we talk about federalism and
state competition in corporate law; hence, my focus on the problem-
atic metaphor of a "race."
Even as to the corporate law literature, however, it was not my
intention to cast it as exclusively directed to questions of federalism
and state competition.6 On this count, I am guilty of some overstate-
ment, as Professor Cunningham appropriately emphasizes.7 I may
even, I will concede, have been inartful in some of the framing of my
argument.
On the other hand, I remain confident in my basic claim that the
corporate literature has put an exaggerated emphasis on the place of
federalism and state competition in corporate law. Consider a bit of
casual empiricism, inspired by Professor Henderson's efforts8 at the
latter: Focusing on a collection of "top ten" journals,9 a search for
published articles including the word "securities" or some term begin-
Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679
(2002).
5 See William W. Bratton, Unentrapped, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 677, 678-79 (2009)
("The negative, as Professor Ahdieh acknowledges, less concerns corporate law itself than aca-
demic discussions thereon.").
6 Cf id. at 679; Lawrence A. Cunningham, The New Federal Corporuiion Law?, 77 Gtio.
WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 & n.14, 695-96 (2009).
7 See Cunningham, supra note 6, at 692-96.
8 See M. Todd Henderson, Two Visions of Corporate Law, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 708,
709 & n.3 (2009).
9 1 included the California Law Review, Columbia Law Review, Harvard Law Review,
Michigan Law Review, New York University Law Review, Northwestern University Law Review,
Stanford Law Review, University of Chicago Law Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view, and Yale Law Journal. I leave it to those more empirically minded than myself to critique
the election of this particular set of journals.
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ning "corporat-" over the last decade yielded 4162 hits. Of those arti-
cles, in turn, almost three-quarters (2906) make at least some
reference to "Winter" or "Cary," to a "race," or to "federalism," "fed-
eralist," or "state competition.' 10 A further search of the same jour-
nals over the same period yielded 218 articles with "securities" or
"corporat-" in the title. A subsequent search for articles with the lat-
ter in text and one of the above "federalism" terms (e.g., "Winter,"
"Cary," "race") in the title, meanwhile, yielded 129 articles-offering
further suggestion of the importance of federalism questions in the
corporate literature.
Given the self-evident limits of this empirical frolic and detour,1
however, the centrality of federalism to the corporate law discourse
might be better evidenced by the literature's broad characterizations
of federalism's role-as in its place as "the genius" of American cor-
porate law.'2 Beyond such rhetoric, one might also ask what we would
expect a neophyte reader to take away from an encounter with the
modern corporate literature. What role would she understand feder-
alism and state competition to play in American corporate law? If not
necessarily its genius, surely she would understand at least the critical
dimension of its institutional design. Even more significant would be
her likely sense of state law as a "default rule" of sorts in corporate
law, against which any proposed intervention by federal authorities
must overcome a prima facie burden. 3 Ultimately, it is this approach
to federalism in the corporate law literature that I would condemn.
I do not argue, as such, that we should federalize corporate law-
let alone that such federalization would ensure optimal results. It may
not. My objection is rather to the claim that it cannot yield optimal
10 I chose to exclude the term "federal," on the theory that it might skew the results.
11 A better empirical indication of federalism's importance to the corporate literature
might be found in the fact that, at least in some recent years, a third or more of the Corporate
Practice Commentator's annual list of top corporate and securities articles have included discus-
sion of the race debate.
12 I am thus in full agreement with Professor Bratton's suggestion of federalism's orthogo-
nal relationship to the three areas of debate in corporate law that he highlights. See Bratton,
supra note 5, at 680-81. It is the inconsistency between this limited relationship and the corpo-
rate literature's strong emphasis on federalism that I seek to emphasize. As Professor Bratton
forcefully puts it, with reference to debates over shareholder-managerial relations, "the federal-
ism reference determines nothing. No serious advocate of management discretion can rest the
case on charter market constraints. Standing up to shareholder primacy requires an affirmative
defense based on economic and governance fundamentals." Id. at 681.
13 I am grateful to Professor Cunningham for his suggestion of this "burden of proof'
frame of analysis for thinking about my objections to the existing literature, and about the alter-
native I propose. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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results. My question, as such, is whether so heavy a finger should be
placed on the scale in favor of state law.
14
It is not my claim that federalism is irrelevant to the operation
and regulation of the modern public governance. 5 To the contrary, I
am even ready to acknowledge its potential "genius. '16 I simply sug-
gest that it does not speak-at least in any direct way-to the ques-
tions of corporate governance that are conventionally characterized as
the heart of corporate law.17 In my account, then, federalism has a
valuable role to play. It simply should not be understood to advance
efficiency in shareholder-managerial relations.
18
Federalism and state competition serve an important function in
promoting efficient behavior by regulators'9-as opposed to the man-
agers whose behavior has been the emphasis of corporate law since
Berle and Means wrote of "the separation of ownership and control,"
some seventy-five years ago.20 State competition may thus help to fos-
ter an efficient allocation of wealth between the state and the firm as a
whole, even if it does nothing to impact distribution of the conse-
quently expanded pie within the firm.21 It is likely to diminish the
extent of regulatory shirking.22 It may encourage states to calibrate
their legal reforms to achieve an efficient equilibrium of innovation
and continuity.2 3 It may likewise promote investment in relevant insti-
tutions, including commercial courts and effective corporate lawmak-
14 Professor Henderson suggests that my argument "may provide Delaware's enemies with
the ammunition they need to win the war against state corporate law." Henderson, supra note 8,
at 711 n.14. Whether or not I am an arms dealer in Henderson's war, the argument herein does
not dictate any conclusion in favor of federal corporate law.
15 See Bratton, supra note 5, at 683 (noting that federalism's "secondary" role does not
make it "irrelevant or trivial").
16 See Ahdieh, supra note 2, at 283-84.
17 See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 1, at 1 ("[C]orporate law ... concerns the relation be-
tween a firm's shareholders and managers ....").
18 I might thus resist my placement in the "expertise" (versus "markets") camp described
by Professor Henderson with reference to Thomas Sowell. See Henderson, supra note 8, at 712.
My position is simply that the corporate lierature cnuld du bctter than it commonly has in
recognizing the appropriate province of each.
19 "Efficient" belongs in scare quotes here, given the far more ambiguous welfare implica-
tions of the distribution of wealth between state and firm, as opposed to manager and share-
holder. See Ahdieh, supra note 2, at 289-90.
20 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 84, 115, 128-40 (1932); see also Ahdieh, supra note 2, at 258-59.
21 See Ahdieh, supra note 2, at 259.
22 See id. at 289.
23 See id. at 286-87.
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ing bodies within the legislature.24 And, of course, it can be expected
to move tax rates closer to the marginal cost of services provided.
25
With such a broad enumeration of federalism's contributions,
have I embraced the traditional account? Is this not all that advocates
of federalism's role in corporate governance see it to accomplish as
well? No, and no. What I describe of the role of federalism continues
to diverge fundamentally from the conventional view. Consider Pro-
fessor Henderson's able restatement of the latter: "[S]tate law is ulti-
mately determinative of the nature of markets. While the market for
corporate control disciplines managers, it is competition among states
that disciplines states from distorting the market for corporate
control. "26
It is this claim-what I characterize in Trapped in a Metaphor as
the assertion of a "reinforcing" role for state competition in promot-
ing efficient corporate governance-that I dispute. 27 In Professor
Henderson's account, state competition is essential to efficient corpo-
rate governance. Why? Because it ensures the enactment of rules
that allow "managerial competition"-the disciplining of managers by
the capital markets-to flourish. It is my argument, however, that
there is no particular reason-beyond its consistent repetition-to be-
lieve this is true.
The critical question is whether managers-by way of self-help,
legal reform, or otherwise-can avoid the effects of state law that is
inconsistent with efficient managerial competition. 2 I believe, at least
in the ordinary case, that they can. Professor Henderson disagrees, on
the ground that "[m]uch state law, and nearly all controversial state
law, is mandatory and cannot be waived. ' 29 But I am unsure this is
true. To the contrary, much of the corporate literature would seem to
turn on the nature of corporate law as constituted primarily by default
24 See id. at 287.
25 Contrary to Professor Henderson's suggestion-as the enumeration above makes
clear-I do not see federalism's utility as lying solely in its reduction of franchise tax rates. See
Henderson, supra note 8, at 711 n.12, 717 n.38.
26 Id. at 711; see also id. at 717 (asserting that "markets and law work together to achieve
optimal governance arrangements").
27 See Ahdieh, supra note 2, at 274-78.
28 Professor Henderson himself acknowledges as much, if only in passing, when he high-
lights "the ease of exit for firms, either through incorporation choice or by contract." Hender-
son, supra note 8, at 719 (emphasis added).
29 See id. at 717-18. The significance of the second shortcoming that Professor Henderson
identifies-my lack of emphasis on the judge-made character of much corporate law-is less
apparent to me. In any case, given the importance of his first critique, I focus on it.
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rules.30 At the extreme, of course, this is the story behind Bernie
Black's account of corporate law as "trivial.
'31
That said, if Professor Henderson is right-or perhaps, to cast his
argument in the most favorable light, where he is right-I concede his
point. Where relevant public rules (a) speak to the efficacy of mana-
gerial competition and (b) are mandatory in nature, my argument
does not hold; in such circumstances, federalism and state competition
directly implicate the efficiency of corporate governance. I believe,
however, that this category is far more limited than Professor Hender-
son suggests.
By way of reference, Professor Henderson cites various rules that
he conceives to meet the above criteria, including "business purpose"
requirements, the traditional issuance of specific rather than general
charters by state legislatures, and bans on the use of poison pills and
other takeover defenses. 32 As to some of these, Professor Henderson
is correct. Where cast in mandatory terms, such rules are not captured
by the analysis I offer. As to many of Professor Henderson's exam-
ples, however, the relevant subject matter is not corporate governance.
Rather than the distribution of wealth and power between sharehold-
ers and managers, such rules constitute state impositions on the
wealth of the firm generally-likely in the service of rent extractions
by state authorities. Rather than a detail, this is a critical distinction.
33
The question Trapped in a Metaphor considers, thus, is the rele-
vance of state competition to shareholder-managerial relations. Can
efficient regulation of managerial behavior vis-A-vis shareholders-
i.e., the minimization of agency costs-be accomplished absent state
competition? I posit that it can, because of the constraint on manage-
rial behavior by the capital markets: what I term managerial competi-
tion, but is, of course, Henry Manne and Ralph Winter's innovation. 34
30 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1417 (1989).
31 Sec Bernard S. Black, !s Coroorate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 551-61 (1990).
32 See Henderson, supra note 8, at 717-19.
33 See Ahdieh, supra note 2, at 283-84.
34 It bears emphasizing that my argument does not directly engage the question of capital
market efficiency-and the resulting efficacy of managerial competition. As Professor Bratton
points out, I simply assume it. See Bratton, supra note 5, at 682. If this assumption proves false,
then the entire argument for federalism in corporate law-dating back to Ralph Winter's re-
sponse to Bill Cary-falls apart. What my contribution seeks to add is the claim that even if-as
corporate federalism's advocates believe-the assumption of efficiency is true, the same result
follows: federalism becomes relatively inconsequential to advancing efficiency in shareholder-
managerial relations.
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Professor Henderson-articulating the standard "reinforcement"
argument-suggests that this is wrong, because state law can be ex-
pected to limit the operation of managerial competition absent regula-
tory competition. Yet this misses the forest for the trees. Why, thus,
would we expect public authorities to act in ways that would reduce
shareholder wealth? Two possibilities present themselves:
The first-on which the modern corporate literature is pre-
mised-is that they will do so at the insistence of managers, given the
latter's influence on place of incorporation, and resulting ability to di-
rect franchise tax revenues and legal work to the state.35 But let us
assume-like the modern literature-that the capital markets func-
tion efficiently. If so, managers should be fully incentivized to act in
shareholder interests. Why, then, would they pursue rules that harm
them?
The familiar response is that managers can no longer be expected
to pursue shareholder interests, if they can instead insulate themselves
from competitive discipline, by way of mandatory federal law. As I
suggest in the article, however, this claim does not hold up, upon fur-
ther reflection: Even if managers could secure mandatory federal
rules limiting managerial competition, this would avail them only so
much. For, as Winter himself emphasized, the relevant motivation be-
hind managerial competition is not limited to competition for capital
among U.S. corporations, but extends to any number of other invest-
ment choices as well-from foreign equity to municipal bonds, and
from real estate to certificates of deposit.36 Managers must compete
against all of these potential beneficiaries of investment capital-not
against other managers alone. If the efficiency of the capital markets
and resulting managerial competition is the baseline, then, Professor
Henderson's argument that, if not for state competition, corporate law
would be riddled with mandatory provisions that limit managerial
competition, falls short. Bluntly put, it lacks a theory.
If public authorities are unlikely to adopt rules harmful to share-
holder interests at the insistence of managers, then, what of the sec-
ond potential explanation for why they might do so? Perhaps, rather
than serving managerial interests, such rules are motivated by poten-
tial rent extractions. Managerial competition, of course, does nothing
to constrain this possibility. If this is the argument for federalism and
state competition, however, Professor Henderson and I have no disa-
35 This, of course, was Cary's original claim. See Cary, supra note 3, at 666-70.
36 See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Cor-
poration, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 257 (1977).
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greement. For the constraint of regulatory malfeasance, shirking, and
the like-as I suspect explains much of the mandatory rulemaking
that Professor Henderson highlights-is precisely the role for federal-
ism that I acknowledge and embrace.
Again, does this concede the argument to the conventional view?
Not in the least. To the contrary, it proves my point. Federalism may
contribute significantly to the operation and regulation of the modern
public governance. Its contribution simply has nothing to do with cor-
porate governance.
Where, then, does this leave us? My conclusion, I understand,
will necessarily be unsatisfying to some: in assessing the choice be-
tween federal versus state rules in corporate law, there is no single,
self-evident answer. Comparative institutional analysis is unavoida-
ble. Such analysis, furthermore, must be in the particular, rather than
the general. It is not enough to simply assert that the federal govern-
ment is a regulatory monopolist, 37 that competition is efficient, or that
regulators are susceptible to capture.38 In a sense, then, rather than
suggesting we should stop talking about federalism, 3 9 my argument
might well be read to suggest that we should talk about it more. We
need, however, to actually talk about it.
In this vein, I found Professor Cunningham's references to my
"shrewd allocation" of the burden of proof to federalism's proponents
to be instructive. 40 In a sense, this highlights the fundamental claim
that I hope to advance in Trapped in a Metaphor. My critique, as em-
phasized above, is not directed to state rules of corporate law, nor
even to resulting patterns of state competition. Rather, it is directed
to the prima facie preference that such rules would seem to enjoy, in
much of the modern corporate law literature. I do not suggest that we
should shift the burden onto those who prefer state law, but simply
that we shift it off of those who suggest the selective imposition of
federal rules. From this posture, I believe, a more fair-minded analy-
sis of the choice between federal versus state rules, in particularized
settings, may be offered.
41
37 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 8, at 720.
38 It is such uncritical assertions that I have in mind in my references to the corporate
literature's presumption of inefficiency in federal corporate rules such as the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. See Cunningham, supra note 6, at 686-87.
39 See Henderson, supra note 8, at 710-11.
40 See Cunningham, supra note 6, at 692.
41 A preference for state law would seem particularly inappropriate if, as Professor Hen-
derson suggests, "there is no easy or theoretical answer as to whether managers, shareholders,
2009]
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Such analysis-as both Professors Bratton and Cunningham
rightly emphasize-has not been absent from the corporate law litera-
ture.42 And, of course, each of their responses develop examples of
such analysis-including Professor Cunningham's creative exploration
of what recent financial regulation reform proposals by the Treasury
Department might presage about the balance of mandatory versus en-
abling regulation of the financial sector.43 Were we to shift away from
the corporate literature's prima facie orientation to state law, I suspect
we might see far more such analysis.
As Professor Cunningham's example suggests, this approach may
not change our conclusions in any given case. By making greater
room for counterargument, on the other hand, it at least allows for
that possibility. In responding to his argument, for example, I might
challenge Professor Cunningham's reliance on particular historical in-
cidents in which federal incorporation or federal rules of corporate
governance were presumed to be-and sometimes actually were-
mandatory in nature.44 Such incidents played out, I might emphasize,
in the shadow of a strong presumption of a state regime of corporate
law-and one that was perceived, at least by many, as overly lax. Fur-
ther, I might cite the counterhistory suggested by the fact that, of the
many proposals for mandatory federal incorporation he mentions,
none were ever adopted. As Professor Cunningham has argued else-
where, meanwhile, even where the federal government has intervened
in corporate governance, it has done so in fairly muted ways.45 On a
employees, or other corporate stakeholders are more likely to get what they want from the
Congress or state legislatures competing with each other." Henderson, supra note 8, at 710 n.10.
42 See Bratton, supra note 5, at 679-80; Cunningham, supra note 6, at 693-95. That said, it
is striking how much of the analysis of individual issues in corporate law (e.g., the use of poison
pills, shareholder voting requirements, provision for independent boards or audit committees) is
framed as a question of federal versus state law. See Cunningham, supra note 6, at 694-95.
43 See Cunningham, supra note 6, at 696-707. Professor Bratton walks through a number
of areas suited to a more evenhanded assessment of the choice between federal and state law,
including efforts to extend the ambit of shareholder voting, see Bratton, supra note 5, at 682;
questions of the precise impact of antitakeover laws, see id.; and the approach taken by the
Delaware courts in the wake of threat of federal incorporation in the 1970s and the takeover
battles of the 1980s, see id. at 682-83.
44 See Cunningham, supra note 6, at 692, 696-97.
45 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Re-
form (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 919-20 (2003) ("Besides enlarging the
enforcer's net and mandating studies, the [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act makes no direct effort to exhort,
encourage or command superior accounting or corporate governance. The Act can be seen as
'sweeping' in a modest sense concerning the number of disparate issues and groups singled out
for explicit or implicit blame in the agitation prompting it."). I might also question the consis-
tency of Professor Cunningham's account with the history of deregulation over the last half-
century, including in the financial sector.
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clean slate, thus, enabling federal rules might plausibly be predicted to
emerge as a middle ground between state law and a comprehensive
and mandatory regime of federal corporate law.
My goal here, however, is not to dispute Professor Cunningham's
analysis. As I understand the latter, he suggests simply that the adop-
tion of federal mandatory rules may be more likely than I suggest. So
long as the claim is not the more imperial one that I believe underpins
much of the corporate law literature-the notion that federal law is
necessarily mandatory or inefficient, because it arises from a regula-
tory monopolist, is not a product of competition, is susceptible to cap-
ture, etc.-I stand ready to be convinced.
In Professor Henderson's response, finally, one might see further
hope for a discourse of comparative institutional analysis along the
lines I suggest. Even in his defense of the standard claim of federal-
ism's role in corporate governance, thus, Professor Henderson con-
cludes with a recognition of the need to engage the question of
"where to defer to markets and experts and in what proportions. ' 46
Between the extremes of market and expertise, he suggests, is "where
the real work of corporate law is to be done. '47 In this, I read him to
encourage just the effort I describe, to identify potential indicia of the
likely efficacy of federal versus state rules of corporate law, in one
setting versus another.48 If we can move toward an analysis of this
variety-judging the appropriate place of federal versus state rules of
corporate law, in particular settings, without any prima facie burden
on one regime versus the other-I suspect we may achieve at an even
richer discourse of corporate law.
46 Henderson, supra note 8, at 728.
47 Id. at 728-29; see also id. at 712 ("The more choice is real and readily available, the less
work there is for experts to tinker at the edges. It follows, of course, that the less choice availa-
ble in the market, the more intervention that may be needed.").
48 See Ahdieh, supra note 2. at 301-02. I even find appeal in Professor Henderson's con-
struction of the relevant analysis as in the nature of antitrust: "The question isn't whether states
are racin_ but whether the market for jaw is workino hiq il an nnti trt-lik-- nalh i, h-...
the measurement is one of competition and choice. If there are low switching costs, ease of
entry, no legal barriers, abundant choice, and so forth, or if the market for law can be improved
by adjusting the process of lawmaking, then it is much harder to justify substituting expertise-
and vice versa." Henderson, supra note 8, at 713; see also id. at 728-29. As this construct makes
clear, Professor Henderson's framework-by contrast with mine--continues to put a finger on
the scale in favor of state law. By comparison with the dead weight placed on it by much of the
corporate law literature, however, I count Professor Henderson's light touch as a significant
move in the right direction.
2009]
